Thursday, March 2, 2017

Debugging running web applications

I've always found it easier to test with code when testing *anything*. So when I see large web applications, my first instinct these days is to build it with code. Recently I was testing a web app that had its own built in web server. Here are the steps I performed to get it up and running.

1. Get a VM and configure the application inside the VM.

2. Identify how the server can be started in debug mode. Usually these servers have startup scripts and shutdown scripts. Look at those. Sometimes you get lucky (like me) and find a debug mode startup script. The debug script will contain a line like this, which adds to your command line arguments while starting the server (some long java command)

-Xdebug -Xrunjdwp:transport=dt_socket,address=8787,server=y,suspend=n

3. Verify that port 8787 is actually listening on the server, along with the other normal ports on which your web server runs (say 80,443 for e.g).

4. If you're using Virtual Box, setup port forwarding so that you can reach all the ports on the guest (80, 443, 8787) from the host. Netcat into the guest ports from the host and verify that things work properly.

5. Now download IntelliJ on your host and make sure it launches.

6. Import your project into IntelliJ directly from the svn/cvs/whatever repository using the 'Intellij Idea -> checkout from version control' at the start. You might have to install the svn/cvs/git client on your host as well, if you do not already have it.

7. Now configure a remote debugging configuration in IntelliJ. Here is a great StackOverflow post to help you do this. Give it a name 'remote_debug_project' or whatever you want.

8. Click Run. Debug remote_debug_project. The lower pane should open up and say something like 'Connected to the target VM, address: 'localhost:8787', transport: 'socket'

9. Set a breakpoint in code that you know will definitely be triggered. Maybe choose the 'login page' verify password function.

10. Visit the web page. Login. The breakpoint should get triggered now. Enjoy a more powerful way of testing web apps now.

If your clients give you source code and you can build it, I definitely encourage this way of testing stuff. The time you take to find stuff out with code is way way lower than with black box testing.

Wednesday, July 27, 2016

SSL/TLS for the layman (Attacks) - Part 2

As with the previous SSL post, this post is NOT a replacement for reading any of the official papers on this attack. It is just my attempt to summarize all of these attacks into a form that is easily readable and understandable by anyone. For the gory details, search for the original paper for each of these attacks and read those.I'll try and link to as many as I can find here

And before we start, its a good idea to bookmark this post and the previous one. I will try and keep both these updated as and when newer recommendations or/and attacks come out. Of course I could miss things, and am reliant on anyone who chooses to trust this post - to tell me that I missed something. Then I can read, understand and add things here. Here goes then.

This is an attack (very similar to BEAST) that targets a property of 3DES and probably any other cipher (I think) that uses 8 byte blocks while encrypting plain text. There's lots of pre-requisites though, for this attack to be successful. Here is a nice read, that I thought broke things up really well.

  • A victim needs to be passing something confidential and which consistently appears in every request (like a session cookie).
  • The attacker must somehow trick the victim to visit a website under the attacker's control, that will make a very large number of requests to the target site.
  • The attacker must be in a position on the network to be able to actually capture all that encrypted traffic.
  • There should eventually be a collision (Apparently this can happen in 2^32 attempts. Please read the link above for why). In other words, bits of plain-text traffic, despite the encryption algorithm doing everything right, must look the same when encrypted.
  • The bit of confidential data should always appear in the same place, when traffic is encrypted.

If all these conditions are met, an attacker could steal the confidential information (session cookie) and impersonate the victim.

The fix is to start disabling 3DES ciphers on your servers or at least ensure that it is not a preferred cipher. Use AES. AES has 16 byte blocks, which means it will take much much longer to have a collision. Limit the amount of time a connection stays open, so even if an attacker *does* steal a cookie, it is of no use.

Beast is a client-side SSL attack. A server is never affected. Here is a link to the original paper.

A victim needs to be logged in to a target site and must have been assigned something secret - say a session cookie. A user then, has to visit an attacker-controlled home page. The attacker, while sending those requests out, must be able to somehow add data to every single request, just before the cookie. If the attacker can't do this, this is not a valid attack.

This page the victim visited then (maybe via JavaScript) makes a large number of requests to the target site, into which the victim is logged in. The attacker then uses these requests and aims at decrypting the secret cookie. This is an example of a chosen plain-text attack. An attacker can send a million plain-texts, get their ciphertexts, analyze them and try and break things.

The attacks described in this paper allow an attacker to obtain the cookies even if HTTPS is in use and the secure flag is turned on. The attack is an attack, because of how CBC works by default - every single cipher suite that uses CBC internally, is affected.

RC4 was suggested as a defence as it was a good cipher (at that time) that didn't use CBC. But RC4 is bad for many other (worse) reasons - some of which are described in my previous post. So don't use RC4 and ignore anyone who tells you to.

TLS 1.1/1.2 on the other hand is better as it protects you against BEAST by default. So if you have all your clients supporting TLS 1.1/1.2 and none that depend on TLS 1.0/SSL3.0, disable RC4 and go this route instead.

Heartbleed is one of the most well known recent attacks just because of how high the impact is. An attacker could, with no user intervention of any sort, connect to a server and extract secrets from the server's memory. This XKCD cartoon, I thought personally was brilliant in explaining the true impact of the issue.

These could be passwords, private keys, PII.. pretty much anything. Once that information is stolen, what can be done with the stolen information, depends on if there are other mitigations in place to protect users. For example: You could steal a root password for some server, but if you have NO way to reach that server, while it's still bad... there is a mitigating control in place.

The only fix is to apply the relevant patches for OpenSSL running on your OS. Hopefully its all seamless, and the libraries on your system will be patched during your 'automatic update' process, however that takes place.

Generally, the way compression works is that it finds repetitive patterns in data and replaces those with a much smaller index. Then when uncompressing, it does things the other way. Looks up the index, gets the original value and constructs the overall response. CRIME is an attack that abuses how SSL compresses these user requests.

The attacker needs to know that some part of a request is always going to be present. For example: She could predict that a request will always have one bit called Cookie: secret=. She wouldn't know what that value is, but the first part .. is always going to be there. So now, if say she can append a second Cookie: secret=, SSL compression would kick in.

SSL would notice that Cookie: secret= repeated itself twice and replace itself with a super-small token; say 0.The overall length of the request will hence go down - to say 25.

Now the attacker will send multiple requests via the victim's browser. Lets say this happens because a victim opens another tab, visiting the attacker's site. Also, lets assume an attacker can see the victim's traffic (well, encrypted blobs anyway)
Cookie: secret=0
Cookie: secret=1
Cookie: secret=2

... and so on. The moment the first character after the '='  matches, SSL compression will, instead of finding a match for Cookie: secret= ... find a match for Cookie: secret=2. And this means, that the length of the request will again go down. But crucially, it'll go down by a little more than for every other character. Meaning if secret=0 or secret=1 .. length will be 25, but if secret=2 .. length will be 24. Meaning, the first byte of the cookie is 2 :). And so on.

The best explanation for this attack was here. The fix apparently is to disable compression. Most vendors have probably rolled relevant patches out as well, so just apply those.

The core principle behind Breach is very similar to that of CRIME, exploits the facts that content is compressed. Only, it targets compression done by HTTP by default, not SSL/TLS as in CRIME. In other words, it isn't an attack targeted at SSL at all. Its just mentioned here because CRIME and BREACH tend to be mentioned side by side very often.

There's some pre-requisites for the attack. The server should use HTTP response compression (most do), user input (and preferably a secret which is the target) is reflected back in the HTTP response.

Similar to CRIME, an attacker is in the middle and can read encrypted blobs of user traffic, and can also get the user to visit a site under their control. Instead of CRIME though, where the attacker measured the length of the requests (which reduced, because of TLS compression) - the attacker measures the sizes of 'HTTP compressed responses' in this case.

And remember, the attacker's input has to get reflected back in the response, multiple times, for compression to even kick in. If it does, then he could send a large number of requests (very similar to CRIME) and observe the effects on the length of the returned (now compressed) response, thus guessing byte-by-byte.

There's no real 'one-size-fits-all fix' for BREACH. If CSRF tokens are the main target, since those are very commonly returned in responses - changing the token after every request, while invalidating the former ones.. will defend against this attack.

Do note that there are many other partial mitigations suggested as well as numerous complexities in the attack itself. The official site for the attack that was linked above is IMO the best resource for understanding this. I'd recommend reading their paper, instead of the presentation :).

This was a Mozilla NSS library specific bug. Alice can bypass signature verification for TLS certificates issued for specific websites. So, if the signature isn't verified properly it means that Alice can construct a certificate... another certificate for say, that looks exactly like the original one... without having the private TLS key for at all.

And once she has the malicious certificate, she'll install that on a website somewhere. And the website (the most common use case anyway) will look just like Phishing website. And then somehow get people to come and visit that website.

That's not as simple as it sounds, because if you tell everyone to go to, they'll end up going to the real site and not Alice's fake site. So Alice then has to perform other MITM attacks like ARP poisoning, DNS cache poisoning, BGP route hijacking (all I can think of now :)) and somehow tell users to go to Alice's site, when they type in in their browsers.

This is a more detailed read on this attack, just jump to the Berserk section below. The fix really is to just ensure you have the latest security patches in place for all the software that uses the NSS libraries.

Padding Oracle
This is one of the most famous crypto attacks on which a number of posts have been written about. This and this are the best reads about it, that I found. Details are always important in any exploit, but since its likely that you want to know more about this than other attacks, just because its so famous, do read carefully.

In a nutshell though, an attacker sends a number of encrypted texts to the server, which decrypts all of them. That's fine, but the server also tells the attacker when the padding of the message is wrong. Meaning, the attacker can brute-force the entire message byte by byte, just based on that information leak.
There's a few key principles to internalize while you're reading.

1. We are NOT at any point, trying to predict the actual correct pad. We're using the property that it leaks if the pad is right or not, to calculate the actual plain text, little by little.

2. You assume that the pad is 0x1 to 0xF per block. Assuming that it's a 16 byte block. Its 0x1 when you're trying to predict the block's last character. Its 0xF if you're trying to predict the 1st character. Note again, you never ever actually know what the pad was.
3. Once you find out the correct character (say X) in the previous block that does NOT give you a padding error, for say, the last byte of the last block, ask the question - 'What's the valid pad here?'. Its 0x1. Now go and look at the CBC bit of the Wiki article. Stare hard at the diagram and repeat this step in your head a number of times, till you get this step. Do NOT go on till you get this.
4. What you get as a result of Step 3 is NOT plain-text. Its close, but it is NOT plain-text. You have to xor X with the result of Step 3 to get the actual plain-text.

The fix is to ensure that you do not tell the user if the pad is incorrect at any point in time.

This is far from a perfect description but its almost impossible for me to explain this any better in a smaller space than I have here. It is after all just an overview of stuff, so you can read some more. Like everything else.

Lucky 13
This is an attack that's very similar to the padding oracle I described above. The way the padding oracle is fixed is by not giving feedback to the user, by calculating a MAC and tell the user that their padding is wrong. So there's no way for an attacker to brute-force bytes and eventually guess plaintext.

So that got fixed. However, SSL/TLS still took different amounts of time while calculating the MAC, for differing padding lengths. And some smart people somehow (:-o) managed to figure that out, and decrypt entire blobs of plaintext again. Crypto's hard, isnt it? :)

Fixes of adding random delays apparently do not solve the problem. Another fix suggested was using RC4 ciphers, but that's a bad idea too as mentioned earlier. So, the only real fix for this is to ensure that people switch to TLS 1.2 and use the AEAD ciphers instead. This apparently is harder than it looks.

Most libraries that are vulnerable to this have fixed this now though, so make sure you have applied all the necessary updates.

Poodle (SSLv3)
The attack itself, conceptually is very very similar to the padding oracle attack. The only difference really, is that if clients and servers choose SSL 3.0 as their encryption protocol of choice, they are vulnerable to this attack.

In other words, not a single cipher suite of SSL 3.0 protects against this attack, and no one should hence be using SSL 3.0 at all.

I'm not going to describe the vulnerability again, since I went through it in a fair amount of detail earlier :). But if you'd like to read the original paper - I've linked it here.

Downgrade attack (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
Now, after reading that brief note about SSL 3.0, one might say that SSL 3.0 isn't a preferred protocol by default at all. Which means that most clients will communicate using TLS 1.x. Which is probably true.

What's also true though, is that its possible for a malicious attacker to perform a downgrade attack against a specific client, and force them to use SSL 3.0, and then use the techniques mentioned in Poodle (or any other vulnerability really) and own them.

To mitigate this to a certain extent, there is something called TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV that will detect if an active MITM attacker is forcing users to use insecure protocols to communicate with servers. In short, the client sends an extra option TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV with its list of preferred ciphers to use. The server also needs to support this option.

Lets now assume that an attacker downgraded the connection to use a weaker cipher. The downgrade will work. The server will however (eventually) notice that the client set the fallback option, and abort the connection if a weaker cipher was used. This is one of the best reads I found.

Note though that this is just a patch. If the server supports SSL 3.0 and for some reason a client uses it to communicate with the server, without an attacker messing with the connection in between... TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV will NOT protect you. So disable SSL 3.0 on every single box you own. Go now :)

Poodle (TLS)
And guess what? The TLS Poodle is very similar to the padding oracle attack again, technically. In the previous attack, I mentioned that getting rid of SSLv3 would defend against Poodle. That turns out to be incorrect as you can see :)

The problem in this case, is that there are certain servers that for some reason use the vulnerable SSLv3 code. Meaning, I could use TLS 1.2 or whatever, but if that piece of code is borrowed from an old, vulnerable version of SSL, its still going to break.

And there are further variations of this attack as well here. And scarily apparently it's not very well known and hence all vendors might not even have patched this issue.

Anyway, as with everything else there's nothing you can do but patch your code if your vendor has released a patch.


This one is seriously creepy. Here you could think you are safe because you don't support a protocol at all - but guess what - you are still vulnerable. Its crazy and I never heard of anything like this.

Drown targets SSLv2. Here's Ivan Ristic talking about it as well, its a nice overview. A lot of servers don't support SSLv2. Browsers don't talk over SSLv2 by default. So the logical conclusion is that you're safe.

But let's say you've (for some weird weird reason) reused the private key to sign another certificate - on another server - and that server supports SSLv2 as well as export-grade ciphers (really old 40 and 56 bit key ciphers). Both servers can be owned by targeting SSLv2 on the 'bad' server. Let it sink in - currently the server supports *only* TLSv1.2, it's all useless if you have some box somewhere that has a certificate that was signed using a shared private key.

As in, you can attack an SSLv2 connection between a client and the 'bad' server. This attack gives you the session key used to encrypt that particular session. Using the session key, you can recover the master key. And once you have the master key you can generate session keys and decrypt *any* sessions - even the one between the client and the good server. Read this OpenSSL advisory for a brief explanation (search for 2016-0703 on the page).

And of course here's a link (its long but its by Thomas Pornin whose answers are unbelievably good most times) on how SSL works and how to decrypt captured, encrypted traffic using the master key in Wireshark.

And yes had you configured your server to only accept cipher-suites which support Perfect Forward Secrecy, that traffic would still be safe from attacks such as Drown.

This targets the fact that clients and servers for some reason still support export-grade cryptography. Which just means encrypting your communication with ciphers that are not very strong and can hence be decrypted. By default browsers don't use these ciphers at all, but remember - the negotiation is in plain text - an attacker can see what ciphers are being chosen.

Because of the bug, an MITM attacker can basically hijack the negotiation process - and tell a client (if vulnerable) to use export grade RSA (512 bit key which isn't strong despite it looking that way) to encrypt all traffic, until the symmetric key is decided. Remember, SSL uses public key (asymmetric) crypto to start off, decides a secret and then uses this secret to encrypt further traffic (symmetric).

Now since the public key stuff is all using export-grade RSA, an attacker can apparently 'break this' (factorization problem - not brute force) and retrieve the decryption key being used. Here's a brief overview article and a really nice article with a bit more detail on the same.

Once this key is retrieved, the attacker can decrypt traffic that passes on the symmetric key and decrypt everything for that session between the client and the server.

Now doing the 'breaking' (which really is solving RSA for manageable numbers) is not fast. So if you really had to do it per-SSL-session, it would still be a bug but less practical. But as per the wonderful Matthew Green, servers reuse a single export-grade RSA key when they start up - until they are shut down. So if an attacker manages to get one decryption key, they can get potentially capture traffic and decrypt it successfully for a number of sessions.

The fix really is to make sure that no one ever uses export grade ciphers again to do anything. This one sort of reminds me of how the NSA want to build back-doors in the IPhone today for 'good' purposes. Very eerie similarities if you ask me.

This is very similar to FREAK described above. It targets the exact same fact that export-grade DH ciphers are supported by clients and servers. Only it attacks Diffie-Hellman (DHE) - another public key encryption algorithm - instead of RSA. The Eff also has a good read.

DH is safe because it is hard to solve the discrete logarithmic problem and get back the initial numbers (exponents) chosen at the start. If those numbers can be predicted/obtained somehow - DH is breakable. But the point is, its very very hard (impossible as of now?) to do so.

The researchers who found LogJam though, did something cool. To understand, lets take an analogy. Think of a 25 character password. If you wanted to crack it using brute force it would be pretty hard and need lots of power and time. But if you built (offline) something called a rainbow table (which by the way is also very time consuming) which had every_single_possible_password for any 25 character long password - things change. The next time you get a 25 char password all you have to do, is look that table up.

Now back to Diffie Hellman, they basically precomputed the discrete logarithm (a hard problem) for 512 bit prime-numbers. Meaning, the next time they saw DH being used, with 512 bit primes, they'd know what exponents were being used, and hence find out the actual symmetric key being used inside. And as it turns out, a lot of servers use the exact same prime number. So if you solve it once, you've basically potentially all connections to those servers.

And the second fact, servers still support export grade DH ciphers. This fact and the rainbow_table_wizardry is what LogJam is about. An MITM attacker will downgrade a connection, force the connection to use 512 bit DH, and then use the rainbow table to find the secrets out.

The mitigation is to think of all the possible services on your servers that use Diffie Hellman. Once identified, ensure they are all configured correctly - namely disable export grade DH cipher suites, and ensure that 2048 bit primes are used to compute the shared secret. On the client side, stay updated - use newer browsers and hope that browsers reject connections that use 'export-grade DH'.

Lucky Negative 20
And here's the newest one as far as I know (please tell me if I am wrong) This one is another padding Oracle problem, where the server responds with verbose error messages on decrypting carefully chosen (by attacker) cipher text and finding something wrong in it. Based on that, the attacker decrypts bytes block-by-block. This is a problem when AES in CBC mode is used. The fix apparently is to (guess what) use AES-GCM with TLS 1.2.


By now, so much of crypto seemingly depends on AES-GCM, that I'm scared a new vulnerability will be discovered tomorrow in it, which will break the Internet again. And then what. Its pretty depressing if you ask me, that we've become so dependent on encryption as a solution to all problems.

And cryptography is hard, really hard - and very easy to get wrong even for people a million times smarter than me. And hence, I'm fairly nervous. And feel that its just a matter of time before I update this post again.

SSL/TLS for the layman (Configuration) - Part 1

There is nothing new in this post. I just got fed up of tracking all the SSL/TLS bugs that seem to come out every month, nowadays. I don't even remember which bug does what, how hard the exploit is and what needs to be done to fix it. And everytime I have to Google. Every. Single. Time. And I'm sick of it.

So, this page. Anything that is a problem with TLS configuration, that I'd report when I do a penetration test for a client, I'll try and briefly touch upon. If there's something new that comes up, I'll update this page. In a 2nd post I cover attacks. When an SSL/TLS attack comes around, I'm just going to update that page.

And no, I'm not claiming this is some pioneering, wonderful, one-stop page. It is just so I can go to a single place and remind myself on what some SSL/TLS misconfiguration is.

Weak SSL/TLS ciphers (Strength less than 128 bit)
The way SSL/TLS works is that the client and server negotiate what key size to use to bi-directionally encrypt communication. If both the client and the server have their first choice as a 40 bit key, it means that until negotiation happens again, they're going to encrypt traffic using a shared 40 bit key.

If someone gets hold of an encrypted traffic dump of this communication, they could go through all 2^40 keys, each time decrypting the traffic. When it makes sense, they'd stop and that's the key... for THAT session. Not for every session between that client and server.

That is still bad, and no one should even support ciphers that use anything less than a 128 bit key, which today is considered safe. Although this Wiki snippet says that this could be bad too, under certain conditions. For now though, its fine. Start thinking though, of supporting ciphers that are at least 256 bits long.

The only reason this is mentioned here, separately was because it was a very popular choice and the preferred cipher for all client-server communication for a long time. If I remember right, even Google had that as their preferred cipher for a long time. I'm "guessing" because it was a really fast symmetric key cipher.

Since then though lots has changed and numerous vulnerabilities have been discovered in RC4. So in short, if this is still a preferred cipher, its wrong. Please disable it on every host+service that supports SSL.

Also, thankfully browser vendors are also moving away from it, so that's good.

Really Really old protocols (SSLv1, SSLv2)
I don't think I've seen anyone use either of these protocols for a while now, even on test servers, but you never know. So yeah, just just disable support for both these. Its ridiculous to have support for either of these.

SSLv1 was apparently never public, which explains why I always saw only SSLv2 enabled even on badly broken servers :)

SSLv2 had numerous vulnerabilities which have their own RFC, which is a fairly strong reason to completely avoid it. Jump straight to Section 2 of the RFC to see some of the vulnerabilities. These affect Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability for any client-server traffic. That's bad.. please never use it.

MD5/SHA1 signed things
A signature for any digital content (like certificates) means that you trust the person who signed the content. So no 2 messages should ever have the same signature. Because, if they did - it'd mean that the person reading the message wouldn't know which message is the real one. Since both appear to be signed by the same person. And could be valid...

Meaning any hash function, where it is possible (practically speaking) to find 2 messages that have the same hash at the end ((hash-collisions) should be avoided. And there's a known attack against MD5 that does exactly this. And its possible to do this with SHA1 as well.

Migrate to SHA256 or SHA512 for all your signing needs at the earliest.

Insecure Renegotiation
Renegotiation in an SSL/TLS context effectively says, 'Can we please decide again...what protocols and ciphers we're going to use to communicate?'. If a client can do this and the server supports it, it means a man-in-the-middle can inject traffic (details here or originally here) and force a client to renegotiate.

Then by getting the timing right, they could somehow piggyback on a client's request, use the client's credentials and do things that the client can do.. without the client's knowledge. Can't ever see a thing but can still do it. Sort of like CSRF inside an SSL/TLS connection.

There's also another exploit discovered that lets attackers DOS the server. There's also a tool by THC to do so. It's a bug, sure but doesn't fix the overall DOS problem as such. It defends against 1 technique. That's it. There's even arguments that this is by design.

The fix is to not let the client renegotiate at all. If a client does try, the server should just reject it. The process is different for different servers.

Lack of OCSP stapling
Clients need a way to decide whether a certificate is valid or not. If it isn't, the client shouldn't let a user visit a site. So, initially there were revocation-lists (CRLs). But those were updated only once every X days, so there was always a chance of a user being owned, in-between. Hence OCSP where the attacker verifies if the certificate is valid, before connecting to it.

The problem with this though is that the destination server, specially if its very busy could get overwhelmed if clients keep hitting it to check certificate validity all the time. And it consumes client resources as well.

Hence OCSP stapling. A server will do the querying-for-cert-validity and return the stapled response, when the client queries it. So no runtime queries from the client directly to the guys who signed the certificate. There isn't a security issue here, unless you think of a DOS against the guys who signed the cert.

If you can though, specially if you have a low capacity internal CA server, its good to enable OCSP stapling.

Lack of HSTS
HSTS if configured right on the server, tells the browser to always send traffic over a HTTPS connection. Its relevant only if the server supports both HTTP (for some legacy reason) as well as HTTPS. So, if its done right and I type http://site the browser will look at the HSTS header and force the traffic over HTTPS. Which is great.

Note though, that the absolute first request before the HSTS response reaches the browser could still be over HTTP, and hence open to an attacker man-in-the-middling the connection and owning a user.

And that's not good either, which is why you should try and notify browser vendors in advance that you plan to implement HSTS. Or at least as soon as you implement it, to reduce the exposure to this attack.

If you only support HTTPS and port 80 isn't even open on your web-server, you can still configure HSTS, but it doesn't improve your security in any way.

No Forward Secrecy cipher support
Lets say an encrypted traffic dump is captured. Now that communication was encrypted using a specific session key, generated using the server's private key...that's how SSL works.

So if the server's private key somehow got stolen, the attacker could use it to decrypt all the traffic she captured earlier.

Lets now say that a client-server communication is encrypted using a cipher that support forward secrecy. Even if the private key is stolen, the attacker can't use it to decrypt any of the encrypted traffic she had.

So ideally, ensure you support some strong ciphers that support forward secrecy and make one of them your preferred cipher of communication.

Thursday, May 26, 2016

Ack, ag... not grep

Grep is a great tool and anyone using any *nix system uses it all the time. In fact you could also use it with Cygwin on Windows. But recently at work, a colleague pointed out that ack and ag are great, much faster tools with better defaults than grep. So while I still go to grep once in a while, ack/ag is my search tool of choice now when doing code-reviews. You can find ack here and ag here. ag is very similar to ack, just even faster (Disclaimer: Only tried this once on my last gig)

While the man page is always a good option, here are some of my favorite switches to get you started.

--java or --ruby: Will limit the search to just files of that type. Meaning it'll ignore a lot of libraries, documentation and other large stuff that happens to be in the same directory

-G cpp$: Search only in files ending with cpp. This one's nice coz if you do --cpp it will search cpp and .h, but you don't want to search inside header files.

--ignore=*.h: Search everywhere except .h files

Recursion: Its on by default, which is almost always what you want in a code-review.

--ignore-dir: Its common to find 567 hits of a function in a source-code-tree and realize that 560 were in a directory 'abc' that you didn't want to search at all. You can use this switch to completely ignore that directory.

--ignore-file: Same as above but for a file. If you have a file in 100 different directories that's matching, but you want to ignore, use this.

-l: This one's similar to grep I think, if you don't want "what" was matched, but where it matched it. Just lists which files matched a pattern.

-i: Same as grep. Case insensitive

-v: Invert match. Same as grep. Case insensitive

The responses for ack were nicer too and more intuitive, I thought. Some of my favorite things:

- Listed filename only once and then all the matches under a file. Grep prints the filename_per _match
- Breaks between files by default. Grep dumps them all together.
- The colors of the response were nicer (IMO)

Also lastly, it appears to have the option to use a .ackrc file to set your options. So then you can just type ack and all the options you set in .ackrc will get picked up on their own.

I mean, you can probably do all this with grep as well, so it isn't meant to say.. 'hey no more grepping for me' .. just that it is a really nice tool that can help in some situations.

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

Respect for developers

At work, we tend to spend time that we’re not on projects however we want. Ideally, however meaning - technically however – not being on Facebook 8 hours a day. But jokes apart, usually someone picks up a skill that he/she isn’t familiar with and tries to learn the same when not on projects. Since most of my professional life in information security has been to break things, I’ve always been curious on how things are on the other side – to build things. What challenges does a developer face? Why is there still such a lot of truly awful insecure code still out there? This despite there being tons of resources to learn from? After all, as a hacker that’s how I’ve learnt all my life – don’t know how to hack a new technology? Go read. Learn. Master. Hack. Why should it be any different from developers?
And so, I decided to fix a ton of bugs in Whetstone, our internal appraisal system which our boss wrote while he was on paternity leave. He takes his vacations seriously, as you can see. Whetstone was written in Ruby on Rails – which is one of my favorite languages for web development – just because of how easy it is to get started. So I go, ooh nice – how hard can it be? And that’s where it all began going wrong…
So obviously, I can’t gut the whole thing and start re-writing the entire system. I have to fix bugs that currently exist. I launch GitHub and see 78 existing bugs. So now I have to prioritize which ones to fix first. I start the process. I pick a simple one to start off with and quickly fix it. I’m excited. I want my change to be visible immediately. Oh but wait, that’s not how it goes. Apparently, git has something called branches that I first need to learn about – so as to not mess with other people pushing code back as well. That puts and end to my coding for the present, and I spend 2 hours reading about how Git handles versions and branches and why its better than SVN and so on. Then I push my code and see it appear on Github. But then someone has to “pull” my changes or accept them. And clearly, while I have permission – it makes no sense to approve my own code – that defeats the purpose. And boss is on leave. No push. No warm fuzzy feeling of first ever fix. Process problems.
Anyway, I’m now feeling better and pick up a few moderately complex issues. It seems I know how to fix it. Code. Compile. Fail. WTF. Google. Stack Overflow. Fail. As it turns out, I’ve upgraded Rails to 4.3 or something and all the fixes on the Internet which have up-votes on Stack Overflow all fail. Somehow after a lot of trial and error I find a fix, but it has taken way way longer than I’d ever expect it to take. And note, this is a simple internal application. If I fixed bugs at that speed in production, as a developer – I’d probably be fired in a week. Skill problems.
Then, I get put on a billable project and forget all about this for a bit. Boss comes back, my 4 changes are accepted. Am I having fun, he asks? Yes yes of course I say, drunk with the success of my 4 massive quashed bugs. Okay, have fun – fix some more says boss. So 2 months later, I pick it up again. So let’s start now. Er, why did I write this code this way? F***, it was so long ago – I should have commented. Lets look at some old code, maybe that explains it. Er no, no comments there either. Just some fancy one-liner SQL looking query. Ha, I’ll just comment the old code then and write new fresh code! That’ll fix it. For sure…… 2 hours later. Undo. Undo. Undo. Okay that broke everything :| and clearly I can’t code. I suck.
And now, after all the undoing, something else isn’t working too. Screw it. Let me revert to a clean state. Let me just delete that stupid whetstone_old directory that I created. And I’ll rebuild everything from Git again – from my old state. Delete. Rebuild. Ugh. Read Me isn’t good. How the hell did I build it last time? What does this error even mean? Note here, that I have NOT fixed 1 single bug yet… 1 hour later – AH so all you needed to do was change the config file entry? Okay. Anyway, let me first collect all my old notes from whetstone_old before I forget stuff like this. Don’t want to waste time.
Eh. Where’s whetstone_old?? Oh no!!! Don’t don’t tell me it was in the directory I deleted #-o. Yes. It WAS in the directory I deleted. Woo Hoo. All gone. I’m screwed. Backups are important. There’s a reason you backed up to whetstone_old. Why would you delete it?
Another day wasted then. Okay okay, now lets fix bugs. Ah, here’s an easy bug – “Display last login time for a user”. 10 minutes. I got this. Just print a date out in the view. Adds date to view. But this is just printing the current date each time ffs :-o. We want it for each user. Oh. That means a new column. In the user database. I know a little MySQL though, from all my SQL injections over years gone by, so this should still be quick….
Error. Can’t connect to MySQL database. Eh? Different port? No. 15 minutes. Can’t figure out where the DB is. RTFM. Sqlite. NOT MySQL. Now if I want to debug anything, I need to learn Sqlite querying. Learn how to use a database. NO ffs I have still not fixed the bug. Okay, now I understand sqlite. But how do I add that column? Learn Rails migrations. Wow. Another half an hour. Add column. Finally fix bug. It lunch time. I should stick to hacking things – I clearly am not good at this stuff. But wait, now I got it.. I know how the DB works, so things should now work out...
Okay, lets login and see if our date prints right. Just to check lol. Obviously nothing can go wrong. Hmm, looks okay. Oh wait, we need to do some stuff with the Date. Why do none of the in-built functions work? Oh no, its not a varchar – its DateTime – only then will some functions work. Or I’ll have to write my own functions. Which would be stupid for such a trivial task. So I have to change the data type in the DB. Learn how to change Rails migrations. And while that looked simple, it didn’t work. The accepted solution was to “DROP TABLE” and “Recreate TABLE”. Ugh.
Now remember, I hadn’t created the table in the first *^%$#@! place. So I now have to find out the structure of every single column of that table and re-create it. Screw it. I don’t want a fancy date. I’ll just leave it as it is and go on… But now that failed migration attempt has screwed something else up – and all my normal code that I never never touched is not working. Fantastic. Things you never coded can break despite you never touching it.
Meaning, I now have to learn the entire old schema. Luckily logging was turned on by default, and the old old old log file was never truncated. Extract the old old query. Convert it into a valid Sqlite query. Drop old table. Create new table. Okay error gone. But now no date display. WTF!!! That’s cause recreating the table destroyed my Rails migration. So do that again. Finally done. In short, playing with the DB isn’t particularly fun, and any re-architecting brings up weird weird problems.
And after all this, all I’ve done is fix one lousy feature request that displays the last login time. Okay let’s move on to the next bug. It’s a security issue now, user IDs are generated sequentially and that’s a problem – a hacker could enumerate all valid numbers. So I need to randomize stuff. Meaning I have to change the data type of a column. Right now, the id column is an integer, I need to convert it to a GUID. Looks very similar to the previous DateTime problem haha. I got this one for sure. Migrations. Change. Blah. . Er. Why did something else break again? Why is nothing working now? Why can’t I even login? Panic. Turns out that id was the Primary Key for the DB. And messing around with the primary key is a bad bad idea. Even worse than messing around with a database. Don’t do it. Just just don’t do it. Deny that feature request. Learn how to change a primary key.
This is terrible. Is this what fixing other people’s code is like? And this is for a small internal application which is relatively well written, compared to some of the bloated code that I’ve seen over the years. Anyway, more hours wasted – I figure out what to do. But now, for some reason I can’t find out where the hell to put the ‘randomizing code logic’. A few more hours… oh wtf.. you know by now that I’m spending more time fixing stupid knowledge gaps than actual bugs.
As it turns out, my boss (correctly) decided to not write a line of code for authentication, and relied on a third party Ruby Gem instead. Well whoopee doo doo. #-o Why am I sarcastic, you say. It means that I now have to hack on some third party module code instead. Start learning third party module code now. That’s another fail, and I have to contact the module owners who patiently explain what to do. Eventually it all works.
Lets look at Bug 3 now. All you need to do is to make a really simple UI change. This CANT be hard ffs. How hard can it be? But by now, I’m in a numb state – coz I’m fairly sure something will go wrong. Oh look. Its CSS. And CoffeeScript. Do I know either? NO. Learn CSS. Learn Bootstrap. Learn Coffee Script. The saddest part is I just need enough to fix a tiny bug, but without knowing the basics – I can’t do it. More time gone.
And this pattern repeats.. again and again and again. Eventually of course, as expected (else I won’t have a job) I improve and start fixing things quicker. But something or the other always always breaks – when you least expect it to. And when its not your code, its harder to fix it. And now I think of those massive banking applications, when the chief architect and the lead developer quit a while ago, and there are 5 new developers. Shudder.
And I still have tons of bugs left. I find my mind thinking of shortcuts and dirty ways of solving problems all the time. I find myself thinking of how to somehow get that number of bugs down. Somehow. Quickly. So I can get back to actually writing new cool stuff. It isn’t easy to maintain that mental discipline. Honestly isn’t. And this is for an internal app, which isn’t critical and with no deadlines except those that I set for myself. I have a new found additional respect for developers.
I always knew a developer’s job is trickier than that of a hacker – and I’d like to honestly say I’ve always been respectful to every dev I have met. But I’ve never sympathized with one. I’ve always felt that it is yet another job that one learns to do well over time. And that’s true, sure – but they do work under greater pressures than I do. There’s other skills in my job as a white-hat hacker, other traits that maybe developers don’t need to learn – but whatever a developer does need to do – isn’t easy. IF IF you want to do it well.
Lastly, I want to tell every white-hat hacker to put on the defensive hat once. Actually code. Code things that people will look at and break and tell you how awful your hacks are. And how you should test more… before releasing to production. See how it feels. :) If not anything else, it’ll make you respect the developer community more than you already do. And that’s how it should be.

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Using the Call stack to debug programs

In large pieces of malware it is difficult, when under time pressure to fully reverse it. So, many times you just put a breakpoint on the imported functions like say send() for outbound TCP connections. Then you run the malware.

What happens now, is that the BP will be hit when the malware tries to send traffic. And that's fine. But where was it called from? As in, which function actually made the call to send()? This is important because it'll help you go back and then find out how the payload was constructed, how the C&C was decided... and many other things.

There's 2 ways to do this. One, you can identify all the references made to the send() call by the binary, and set breakpoints on all of them. Then when one gets hit you can inspect it further. This is the most obvious way to do it.

The other way is to first, as usual set a breakpoint on the function you want to trace. Here I just choose SetUnhandledExceptionFilter() as that's the first function I can see :). The address immediately after that is 0100251D - make a note of that.

Then, instead of searching through the 123 references to the call and trying to guess which one is useful, look at where the function is returning to when the  breakpoint is hit. This can be found on the Olly call stack. Many times you have to step through a lot of system function code, but eventually, it will return to user code. I tend to use the Ctrl+F9 while in system code, and keep watching the call stack for when the address changes to one where the code is running from.

Then I visit that address, set a breakpoint and hit F9 again. This time I will break inside the exact place where the call was made from. Note the address? :)

Then we go to that address and set a breakpoint and run...and we'll break in the exact place where the call was made.

Debugging child processes - Olly 2.01h

A lot of malware creates new processes and injects the actual malicious code into the memory of that process and then runs it from there. could start debugging malware.exe...but then find out that it has called CreateProcess() and created a new child process boo.exe. Then it called VirtualAlloc() and allocated memory into some part of boo.exe.

The point being... malware.exe has nothing and you now need to debug boo.exe. There's a few different ways I have tried, all to varying degrees of success.

- Get PID of the Child process from Process Explorer. Then go to Olly and Attach to process.
- Set Olly as JIT debugger. Windows Task Manager. Right click - Debug
- Set Olly as JIT debugger. Set the entry point of the process to CC (a breakpoint) and run the process.
- Try and attach Immunity to the process while debugging the parent in Olly.

But none of that, for multiple reasons worked at all... or worked very sporadically. That sucked.

Luckily OllyDbg 2.01h has this new (well for me ;)) option to debug child processes created by Olly. Meaning, if I'm debugging malware.exe and it creates a new process..and you have this option checked, it'll automatically open a new window and load boo.exe into it :). Perfect.

You can find this option in Olly 2.01 (latest version) in Options - Events. Tick the box that says 'Debug child processes' and save yourself a lot of pain :).

View PE header - Olly 2.01

Many times we want to view the PE header to study certain fields. Its easy enough to do this with a million PE editors out there. You could even do it programatically - I use the pefile module in Python to do it. There's almost certainly others. But the point is... that I love Olly :). How can we do it in Olly?

Well, in Olly 1.10 you could go to the PE header location in the Dump section, right click and select Special - PE header. And this would perfectly parse the PE header and display it in the Dump. Or just go to View - Memory Map, right click and select Dumo.

But Olly 2.01 doesn't have this. The option seems to have changed. I had trouble finding it but finally managed. There is no Special -> PE header menu but a 'Decode as structure' menu.  Here are steps on how to view the PE header in Olly 2.01:
  • View - Memory Map. Locate PE header for the exe. Get the address from here.
  • Go to the Dump section of Olly. Ctrl+G - enter address.
  • So you can right click on the start of the PE header (MZ)  - Decode as structure and in the Drop down box there select IMAGE_DOS_HEADER. Now you see just 1 section decoded.
  • Scroll down a bit till you come to the PE header. Right click on the PE header (anywhere...but make sure its inside the PE header, not the DOS header - Decode as structure - IMAGE_FILE_HEADER.

And so on.. use all the different IMAGE_ structures to decode the entire header. Its a bit of a pain really, and I preferred the old way :( or maybe just use another tool - just not Olly 2.01 for this. Its good for other structures though..probably, as you might have guessed.

Extracting PE files from memory

Was recently trying to debug some malware that someone gave me. The malware was extracting itself into memory and working from there. It is possible to debug the malware from memory itself but its a bit painful, since we have to debug the entire memory each time, let the memory get populated with the malicious code and then try and understand what the code is doing. This is a waste of time - and if we can avoid it, we should.

As it turns out, its possible to dump contents from memory. This is specially useful if its a PE file that's unpacked into memory. Coz.. you could dump it and reverse it separately without all that running of the original malware that unpacked it.

I always knew this was possible but for many reasons (a laziness to learn being foremost ;)) I never did it. This time, I was determined to figure out how to do it. Turns out it is fairly straightforward. All credit for me learning this goes to this blog -

That blog should be self explanatory really, but here were my steps.
  • Load process in Olly and debug it as usual.
  • Once the process has loaded in memory, locate it in the Dump section of Olly.
  • Right click inside the dump. Backup - Save data to file to an EXE file on disk.
  • Launch a PE Editor (I use LordPE). Locate the last section. Add the RawSize and RawOffset. Record the number.
  • Open the hex editor and go to this number (offset) inside. Delete all content after this number. Usually this is all zeros.
    Now go to the start of the file. Delete all content inside the file upto the start of the header (4D 5A). Save the file.
  • Open the file in Olly...and there you go.. a normal EXE file.

I tried some plugins like OllyDumpEx but they did not work for me. They probably are fine - just that I mostly made a mistake while using it. I will try some nice plugins soon and update this post when I am done.

Hope this post helps someone easily unpack malware from memory manually. Its fairly easy and you do not need a plugin to do this :)

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

Volatility - Extracting malware signatures from memory

There's a million tutorials online on Volatility and how to use it. This post will teach you nothing new. It is just my own way of learning the tool. All I'm going to do here is to go through each and every plugin which is listed very well here and very well explained here and make my own notes. If you're starting off with Volatility don't read this post - go read the official documentation.

The purpose quite simply is to just help me remember the tons of plugins that Volatility has, so I can use it while performing malware analysis of all those dangerous pieces of malware.

I'll use the memory images of Shylock downloaded from here to practise running Volatility's plug-ins against. This image can be downloaded from here. The images that I got from the Volatility Git repository (git clone) didn't work for some reason.

- The -f  (image name) and --profile (what OS the image was extracted from) switches are used in almost every command.

- Imageinfo suggests profiles while kdbgscan definitely identifies the best profile to use. Sometimes though kdbgscan also identifies multiple processes. In such cases look at the number of processes that it identified and proceed accordingly.

- pslist gives you a list of processes in the memory. psscan does the same but includes hidden processes which are there maybe, coz of rootkits. pstree does the same but gives you a nice view like Process Explorer does on disk.

- dlllist is a nice plugin that gives you the DLLs loaded by a process. Its best to identify the PID of the process you are after using the previous plugins and then use the -p switch with this plugin. dlldump is the next logical step, you find a DLL and try and dump it. Again, makes sense to focus on a specific process.

- handles, while super-verbose is a nice way to quickly see what all stuff a process is referring. Use the -p and the -t here to filter output. Its very similar to the Sysinternals handles utility.

- cmdscan lists out all the commands an attacker typed and consoles goes one step further by listing the exact output that the attacker saw when she typed it.

- connections lists out all the connections that were active when the image was captured. connscan is cooler in that it also identifies connections that were terminated.

- sockets lists all the listening sockets as well. sockscan does the same thing but in a different way. netscan does the same thing but for different platforms.

- hivelist searches for registry hives in memory. You can actually print out entire registry subtrees using printkey with the -K option which searches all the hives in hivelist's output above and returns the keys with its values if found. hivedump is super-verbose and recursively prints all the keys found.

- hashdump gets stored credentials from memory of all the local OS accounts. You could grab hashes from here and then crack those offline.

There's plenty more and I'll keep adding to this list as I play with them over the next few days. :)

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

Writing ClamAV signatures

Obviously while learning about malware analysis it is not enough only to know how to reverse malware. I should know how to protect against them as well. So I wanted to learn how to write signatures really well - it could be useful. So I will learn how to do so using the following:

  • ClamAV
  • Yara
  • Suricata
  • Snort
This post... I'll start with ClamAV. Here are my rough notes. The aim is to be able to refer to them over time. They are not the most polished blogs ever nor do I intend to make them appear to be that way :)

Here goes.

Stop updater daemon: sudo /etc/init.d/clamav-freshclam stop
Update now: freshclam
Update but run as a daemon: freshclam -d
Stop clamd daemon: sudo /etc/init.d/clamav-daemon stop/start. Don't try and start it from the CLI

Send clamd commands using socat:

  - socat - /var/run/clamav/clamd.ctl. Then type command. If started in TCP mode though, you can normally telnet to a port.

  - The connection to the socket times out though fairly quickly by default, so I'd have the command copied to clipboard :)

  - List of all commands available in the clamav documentation on page 17

Scan files: clamscan /tmp/virus_test
Scan files using clamdscan: clamdscan - < /tmp/virus_test

Use libclamav to scan files from inside other software. Can be used with C programs only.

Info about a database file: sigtool --info

Creating signatures:

- Make sure that you unpack the binary before doing this, else it's not very useful.

Hash based signatures:

sigtool --md5 test.exe > test.hdb
clamscan -d test.hdb test.exe
The moment a single byte changes, this signature will fail

Extract sections from PE file and create a signature for each section:

Use my hash_sections script to do this. Another option is to save all sections and use sigtool --mdb

Remember sections with a zero size will cause clamscan to break so don't add those

Also remember that this method is best used AFTER you have done all your analysis and want to detect a packer.. so here you don't necessarily have
to unpack the binary before writing a signature

Similar files but minor difference in certain bytes

This means that it is the same malware but hash based signature or section-hash based signatures will not work. For example:
md5sum 03*
  ae831fcf5591dc0079ebfe4654f23f52 031.exe
  b20a1db0a01f7a6f14f503a6fcdd6c0f 03.exe

Here's a sig where the {4} are the only bytes that change. Save these manually into a file with an ndb extension:
TestSig:1:EP+6:8DBEEB7FF7FF57{4}10909090909090 [EP is entry point, and this can drastically reduce false positives]

Same logic but with much more powerful signatures. These must be stored in ldb files:

The difference here is that everything is separated by ; characters. All the patterns are right at the end. The penultimate block is the one that decides how this pattern is actually applied, the previous block decides which files the signatures is applied to. The first block is just a name..can be anything.

Whitelist files

Same name as the database in which the detection signatures exist. So if all signatures are in daily.cld

The whitelisting file should be by the name daily.fp and have this line (hash : size : random name) in the same dir as daily.cld
5523530941c409b349ef40fa9415247e:51204:Whitelist signatures

This is despite a BAD signature being there in the daily.cld... it'll just IGNORE the bad one

Whitelist specific signatures

Same name as the database in which the detection signatures exist. So if all signatures are in daily.cld

The whitelisting file should be by the name daily.ign and have this line (goodDBname : line number : Actual signature name) in the same dir as daily.cld

This is despite a BAD signature being there in the daily.cld... it'll just IGNORE the bad one

Some nice References:

The sample files, scripts and its signatures can be found in my Git repository -

Friday, January 30, 2015

A malware sample I analyzed

Recently I analyzed a malware sample. I don't know what it was or whether I completed it but I stepped through it and wrote a very detailed report about it that I'd like to share now.

It is completely possible that I have missed things in it, but honestly anyone reading through it, specially if you're at the beginner-intermediate level should get some useful information from it.

I'd love to hear more feedback on how things can be done better, and if anyone has indeed analyzed this deeper and better than me - do call me out.. and if you can get in touch with me somehow so I can learn :)

I started a new repository on Git just now - to add a lot of my random stuff that doesn't really have a specific home. Here's the link to the PDF report (no it is not malicious :)).

I cannot see how I can upload the sample to offensivecomputing so here is a link to a virus total analysis instead. I guess anyone interested should be able to find a sample using the hashes on this link.

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

Statically linked binaries - Library detector

A program can be compiled dynamically or statically on Linux. For simplicity's sake - I considered only C binaries. When you dynamically compile a program the libraries do not get included into the binary itself - the functions that they export are called at runtime. In a statically linked binary however, all the libraries that the binary needs ... to run... are part of the binary itself. And that if you are reversing a pain. Coz you don't know which part of the code is the binary...and which part is library code. IDA detects a lot - but not all of it... not enough ..for sure. So I decided to try and so something..

This little project came into my mind primarily while playing the reversing challenges in CTFs. The files there used to be massive (4 digit numbers of functions) and very difficult to solve (for me anyway :)). I would never be able to identify which code was library code - in the case of statically linked binaries. Thus I could never complete those challenges OR it took me a lot of time. I still can't complete many but that's a separate story ;)

Anyway TL;DR I wrote a few simple IDAPython/Python scripts that basically compare the IDB of the binary to be reversed and a whole lot of library code. The more idea you have about the exact libraries that were used while building the binary - the more accurate this tool will be.

It is certainly a start to a fairly complex problem IMO and I hope that people more knowledgable than me in this space, can extend this and make it even more useful. At the very very least, I hope it will at least show people what NOT to do while attempting to solve this problem :)

The code I wrote can be found here.

Hopefully over time - I can make this even better or maybe find a better solution to this problem.

Friday, January 23, 2015

Anti debug mechanisms - Windows

Been busy with some stuff so haven't got time to blog much at all. Anyway I was playing the Flare challenge and the last one was challenge 7 which was a 32 bit Windows PE file. I haven't yet managed to complete it due to some silly detail that I've overlooked :(. All the same though - there were a few really nice Antidebug and AntiVM mechanisms that I learnt about and thought of sharing. If I wait for the challenge to get over - I might end up never writing it :).

IsDebuggerPresent: This is one of the oldest tricks to detect a debugger. Usually the malware will call this function and check its return value. If its 1 it means it's being debugged.

PEB IsDebuggedBit: The PEB is a block that contains a lot of information about the currently executing process. One of the first fields in this structure is the IsDebugged bit. If the application is running inside a debugger, the value of this bit is 1.

SIDT: The IDT is a data structure that has the addresses of numerous functions that are called when specific interrupts occur on a machine. SIDT stores the addresses of the current Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) into a register. On a normal machine, the address of the IDT is lower than 0xd0xxxxxx. If the address is greater than that, the malware is running inside a VM.

VMXh:  There is a privileged instruction called IN. Meaning... it will run only in kernel mode - a normal user can't write an assembly program and call it. When in eax,dx executes, it fills up ebx...and if it has 'VMXh'... it's running inside VMWare. So malware will do this check as well to detect if its running inside a VM.

OutputDebugString: This API will try and print a string. That's it. But it'll be successful only if the program is being debugged. You'll see the string that was printed in the Log window of the debugger. Malware will probably check if the function succeeded and make a decision accordingly.

CC bit checking: The single byte CC stands for a software breakpoint. The moment you set a breakpoint, while debugging a program, the byte on which you set your program is set to CC. Malware might search an entire range of addresses for the presence of any 'CC' byte and exit if it finds one. Meaning... if there is a CC byte - there is also a debugger. There's no reason for one to be there if it runs normally.

NTGlobalFlags: If a program runs inside a debugger the offset 68 of the PEB (NtGlobalFlags) is set to the value 70. This value is set based on the values of some heap manipulation flags. Malware will check for this value and accordingly make a decision.

Apart from these 6 checks, the Fireye challenge also used the LocalTime64 API to check if the time was between 5 and 6pm on a Friday and would go down the wrong path if it wasn't.

Your filename on disk needed to be backdoge.exe. You needed to be connected to the Internet so you could get a couple of IP addresses ( and which was also used. Lastly it also retrieved a specific string 'jackRAT' from a Twitter post and used that as well.

Basically, each of these checks caused the code to XOR with a different string. If you went down the wrong path, it'd still XOR, but with the wrong string and your end result - which is supposed to be another PE file would be incorrect.

So that's where I'm stuck :( - I think I have all the checks down - but I'm missing some fine detail .. somewhere and getting an invalid file. Oh well, maybe someday - I think I will look at one of the online solutions now. I've spent a lot of time on this without much success.

Here are some references though which I found very useful:

I hope you learnt a few things. None of this is really new..honestly... but hey, it's just a place where I keep writing my thoughts out as I learn things.

Sunday, December 21, 2014

FireEye - FlareOn Challenge 6 Argument 2

So if you read my previous'd know I was stuck on Argument 2 last time. I finally managed to crack it with a little help. The answer had been staring at me all the time and somehow I'd overcomplicated things. Oh well. I learnt a lot.

So..the last time in the previous post, I was stuck at the function 401164. I went through it multiple times, sat and marked blocks out in IDA, used Hexrays on it to get C code (I don't do this until it's an absolute last resort) but all I could see was loads of operations on a big chunk of encrypted text.

Yeah. So I found this chunk of text at 729900..and this is exactly what it looked like.


The function iterated for the length of this string and performed some operation on it ... using a byte array at 4F4000. But I couldn't understand what it was doing....with all that math. Specially because the very next function, was just an exit function.

Now I'd marked it as an exit function a long time back...and forgotten about it...and not analyzed its code carefully at all. After all, it's exit() ffs... what's there to look into? I was wrong :(

I pinged a person on reddit for a pointer. He/she said I was close...and should think about encoding and the = sign. Sure, I think. Base64. Obviously. But why is that relevant here? Yeah the encrypted text had an = at the end...but so what? It's too big for an Email address. So what's the damn point of decoding it? That's what I'd thought...a long time back.

Anyway I copied the text and threw it into an online Base64 decoder...

and my eyes popped out when I saw what I did.

Look at the screenshot...the right pane..towards the bottom. You'll see some ASCII text called /bin/sh. It's trying to call a shell.... it's shell code. And I'd been staring at it for at least 2-3 days. #-o. Serves me right for assuming things. Sigh.

Anyway, if there's shell code, that means the program is going to jump to it at some point. And I all that's left is that exit() call at 44bb2b. When the hell is it jumping? And where's that code?

So I then decide to separately throw the shellcode into a disassembler and analyze it. Since it didn't have the ELF header and I was in no mood to recreate one (if I could :D) I threw the code into an awesome online disassembler at

...and the code there looked very very familiar. I'd seen it somewhere. Where? Then it hit was IN the exit function.

The exit function had code that compared something with '1b' at the offset cfc4... and exit if it didn't match. And what was it comparing it with? The 2nd argument. And if you didn't enter that correctly..which I wasn''d fail.

So at this was just about reversing the algorithm inside. Here I have a confession to make. While searching for hints and verifying the 1st argument, I'd accidentally seen part of the 2nd argument on one of the solutions, so I knew it started with lin. That sucked. But anyway... just to verify I entered 'l' passed the jump. So the I just needed to solve that entire algorithm...which was just different basic math at every step. Rotate right an left, xor, add, and sub..with binary and hex. I started doing it manually...but was just horribly bored as the pace was very slow guessing it.

So I decided I'd write code for it and solve it. It's basically mind numbing work predicting character by character...and the algorithm is different each time. An utter waste of time really... and this made no sense to me from FireEye's perspective. Oh well I guess that's how real malware is :shrug

Here's the code I wrote - it's just a very quickly written piece of code. Not great at all. But it works:

I wrote code till the "@" character...and then just guessed the rest. Here too...out of sheer tedium...I guessed 1 character...manually added it to my flag..and then proceeded to solve the algorithm again for the same character. And wondered wtf was wrong now...and why gdb kept throwing me out.

Only googling the exact answer showed me the error of my ways :|. Obviously, that's not how it works in real life...but really I was done...and there was nothing left to solve in the challenge, so I think it was ok.

The final flag was:-

Oh you bet. This was a painful painful challenge. What an utter load of junk there was inside. 7 or 8 functions out of some 2700+ that were useful. Sheesh :)

p.s..The bad thing was that someone had written the flag of challenge 7 underneath challenge 6... :( but luckily I have already forgotten it :D. I won't solve challenge 7 for a few days till I am sure I don't remember anything.